Today’s most useful story is about a patch deadline, and the most embarrassing is about a missing password and a spam filter. The rest is about control: who has it over a company, a legacy system, or collateral.

1. The police-data leak that sat in a spam folder

Tigerfish, a San Francisco transcription firm whose customers include police departments, prosecutors’ offices and tech companies, left an Amazon S3 bucket openly listed on the web. According to TechCrunch, it held transcripts of police interviews, bodycam footage, raw audio and video, and customer invoices. Reaching it took an easy-to-guess web address and no password.

The failure that stands out is the second one. Researcher Anurag Sen found the bucket in October and emailed the company, but heard nothing. Tigerfish says his message landed in its spam filter. It locked the bucket only after TechCrunch got in touch, and it is unclear whether customers have been told.

The misconfiguration is the familiar part. The sharper lesson for anyone buying from vendors that hold sensitive material is that a company can be unreachable by the people trying to help it. Sen’s own line is that the real crisis is systems left wide open, not shadowy hackers. When you vet a vendor, ask who reads its security inbox as well as what certifications it holds.

TechCrunch

2. nginx2root: patch now, and don’t assume Cloudflare has you covered

On November 18, F5 and nginx.org disclosed ten nginx vulnerabilities. Five, grouped as nginx2root, are memory corruption bugs that an unauthenticated attacker can use to crash a worker or, per researchers at Xint, run commands on the server. The worst, CVE-2026-123007, needs only HTTP/2 enabled and dates to nginx 1.9.5 in 2015. Censys counts about 8.8 million services running a potentially affected version with HTTP/2 on, though version strings overstate the risk because distributions backport fixes.

Cloudflare’s post is reassuring, but it also sells Cloudflare, so read the caveats closely. Proxied origins are shielded from the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 bugs because Cloudflare terminates those connections and never forwards the attacker’s frames. That protection disappears if your origin IP is reachable directly. It also doesn’t cover Spectrum TCP/UDP traffic, the mail proxy, or grey-cloud servers, and it only partly covers the resolver bug.

Cloudflare says none of the five is in CISA’s exploited-vulnerabilities catalog and it has seen no in-the-wild exploitation. Exploiting them for code execution also requires bypassing ASLR. So the immediate task is to inventory your nginx instances and upgrade to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, then restart, because a reload won’t swap the binary. Xint also found a Linux SCTP kernel bug that can turn that foothold into root, and as of November 18 it had no kernel fix.

Cloudflare Blog

3. Nvidia’s Huang scandal is now a disclosure problem

California Attorney General Rob Bonta has served Nvidia with an investigative subpoena. He says his office is examining whether Nvidia’s or Jensen Huang’s actions led to China obtaining advanced chips or confidential information, and whether Nvidia misled investors and the public about that risk. TechCrunch reports the trigger was news of Huang’s relationship with a woman the U.S. government believes is a Chinese spy. Huang resigned last week after further revelations about affairs with company employees.

Note what the legal theory is. Bonta’s statement is about disclosure: companies cannot mislead investors. The affair is the backdrop, not the charge. The probe is also one of several, with a reported SEC civil probe, a congressional subpoena threat that Huang has now agreed to meet by testifying, and a board-hired law firm and independent directors.

That matters for founders and boards. A charismatic founder is a business asset, but the risks around that founder become something the company has to disclose accurately. Nvidia’s new chair says Huang won’t return as CEO. Whether investors were misled is still only a question investigators are asking.

TechCrunch

4. A 1970s-era UK police system may go three years without support

The Register’s headline says a “critical” 1970s-era Fujitsu system used by UK police could remain unsupported for three years. The text we received was only page navigation, so the specifics are missing, including what the system does, who would be unsupported, and why.

The headline still points at a real distinction. Old software is a nuisance, but critical software with no vendor support is a risk with a duration attached. If the three-year figure holds, the open question is who carries that risk and what they do about it in the meantime.

The Register

5. SpaceX’s lenders want their chip collateral to stay grounded

Ars Technica’s summary says SpaceX bondholders want valuable chip collateral kept on Earth and within reach. Ars Technica’s full article was blocked, so only that line is available. We don’t know the terms, the size of the collateral, or the exact covenant language.

The logic is plain enough, though. Collateral only works if a lender can find it and take it back. Hardware in orbit is neither easy to reach nor easy to repossess, and a launch failure could erase it. This is a reasonable reading of the headline, not a reported motive. If it holds, the story is about collateral law and logistics rather than any flaw in the chips.

Ars Technica